Eviction Attorney In Houston

Evictions and damages resulting from eviction-related issues can become very confusing.  Your eviction attorney should have a good grasp on eviction-related issues.  In Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, reh’ing o’ruled, no pet), the Court gives us some important tidbits on eviction law practice, and the case illustrates how complex Texas eviction procedure can become, especially when there are other business issues unrelated to the eviction.

This article is geared to lawyers.  If you are in need of an eviction attorney, please call Hector Chavana Jr at 713-979-2941.

The Court in Nguyen informs eviction lawyers:

• Only very limited issues can be litigated in the same case as evictions
• Certain very limited issues can be raised for the first time on appeal from justice court eviction actions
• A county court asserting appellate court does not have jurisdiction to hear issues outside of these limited add-on issues
• If an eviction case is consolidated with a county court action that has properly exercised original jurisdiction, the consolidation will be error, but not harmful, and, therefore not reversible
• The remedy for an erroneous consolidation is mandamus

Factual Background:

Nugyen and Tu were partners in a bakery called Alpha.  Alpha signed a lease, with Alpha as a tenant, and with HKDI as landlord.  That lease required HKDI to approve the sale of Alpha.  Nguyen and Tu had a partnership dispute, (“Action 1”).  In their suit, Nugyen was awarded 70% of the Alpha, and the lease was assigned, without HKDI’s prior written consent,, against the terms of the Alpha lease.

HKDI notified Nguyen of the breach, and Nguyen filed an action in county court at law (“Action 2”), seeking a declaration that the assignment was not a breach, and also alleging tort claims.  Nguyen’s overall position was that the assignment was not a breach because 1) the assignment was signed on threat of contempt in the Nguyen vs Tu action; and 2) Tu’s attorney had worked in bad faith and had conspired with HKDI to intentionally cause Nguyen to breach, since Tu’s attorney had represented HKDI previously.  Nguyen alleged that HKDI and Tu were motivated to manufacture a breach by Tu’s desire to set up a competing business at a nearby location.

About two months after that suit was filed, HKDI’s eviction attorney filed suit in justice court for eviction.  HKDI confessed in judgment and immediately appealed to the county court at law (presumably to speed up the process), (“Action 3”).¹ Nugyen countersued and filed what was an essentially third party action against HKDI’s president and a cross claim against Tu, asserting the same or similar claims as in Action 2.

Tu and HKDI moved to sever or strike the claims, claiming the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over those claims, since the original claim was an eviction suit. Nguyen sought to consolidate Action 2 with Action 3, but before the court ruled on the consolidation, Nguyen filed an amendment, removing HKDI’s president from Action 3. The Court in Action 3 consolidated and ordered Action 3 to be consolidated with Action 2.  In Action 2

[t]he jury found for Nguyen. The questions on appeal were “complicated by the facts that the two suits were consolidated; that in one suit, the county court exercised appellate jurisdiction; that in the other suit, the county court exercised original jurisdiction; that in both suits, the parties sought, among other things, a determination of the right to possession; that the suits were tried together after consolidation; and that one judgment was rendered in the consolidated cause and included, among other determinations, a determination of the right to possession

Appellate Posture

The appellants claimed that many of the procedures were improper, and couched the trial court’s error in different terms, alleging that the trial court’s failure to sever the tort claims was reversible error, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the tort claims, and that consolidation was fundamental error.

The Court noted that, except for limited matters related to rent, and defending and withholding possession (now TRCP 510.11), the sole issue in a forcible detainer action is possession.  If the case had not been consolidated, the appellate court’s jurisdiction would be severely limited pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code 24.007, which makes commercial eviction cases, essentially final at the county court at law.

“The prohibition against [appellate court’s] considering possession includes consideration of any finding ‘essential to the issue of,’ ‘dependent on,’ or ‘primarily concerned with the issue of’ possession.”  Of course, the court of appeals can hear appeals on most other issues.

In this case, which was a true consolidation of an eviction case with a separate tort cases, the appeals court exercised limited jurisdiction on possession and plenary jurisdiction on the tort issues.  The opinion makes mention of the appellate jurisdiction of the county courts over eviction cases, but an eviction attorney or real estate attorney in Houston may cite the Government Code 25.1032 for jurisdiction of County Courts at Law.

One of the issues was whether the county court at law had jurisdiction to find for Nguyen, being that eviction cases normally can be heard with very few other claims, which are basically claims for past due rent, and TRCP 510.11 claims.  The Court said that the county court at law had no jurisdiction to hear the counterclaims filed in Action 3.  It was error for the court to have denied a motion to sever or strike.

However, the error was rendered moot when Action 3 was consolidated with Action 2, since the county court at law did have jurisdiction over those claims.  The claims in Action 2 were properly filed, since claims for damages related to possession can run concurrently in other courts with the eviction action.

The Court concluded the issue:

We hold that the trial court’s error in failing to sever Nguyen’s counter-claims and third-party claims against HKDI and Duong in the forcible-detainer suit before consolidation was rendered moot by the fact that the same court could consider these claims and damages after consolidation by exercise of its original jurisdiction that arose from the tort-suit-related pleadings.

The Court also reasoned that the county court did not lack jurisdiction to hear the tort issues, since it had original jurisdiction to hear the tort issues and appellate jurisdiction.

It also found it had jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the tort suits, even though it would not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the eviction case.  The reasoning is not extremely clear as to why the Court of appeals had jurisdiction, but the Court seems to say that it has plenary jurisdiction to hear the tort issues, and therefore has jurisdiction to consider the propriety of consolidation of the tort issues.

Finally, the Court said that consolidation was error, but was not harmful.  Without harmful error, the error is not reversible.  The remedy for the error, said the Court, is mandamus, asking the Court of Appeals to order the lower court to adjudicate the eviction in a speedy manner.

The rest of the case provides good insight as to the law that is often involved in eviction-related issues, including standards for tortious interference with a contract by a corporate officer acting in the corporation’s best interest.  (The officer must be acting solely in his own interest and against the interest of the corporation in order to be liable).

In any case, this is one case that a Houston eviction attorney should read with care.  If you need an eviction attorney, please call Hector Chavana Jr at 713-979-2941.

1. As an aside, some cases say that a confession in judgment does not bar appeal from justice court, so long as there are no negotiations with the opposing that would allow the opposing party to claim that the appeal is barred by a settlement agreement or by estoppel.